Abstract. We develop a framework for modelling and reasoning with uncertainty based on accept and reject statements about gambles. It generalises the frameworks found in the literature based on statements of acceptability, desirability, or favourability and clarifies their relative position. Next to the statement-based formulation, we also provide a translation in terms of preference relations, discussas a bridge to existing frameworks-a number of simplified variants, and show the relationship with prevision-based uncertainty models. We furthermore provide an application to modelling symmetry judgements.
Introduction
We are in the business of dealing with uncertainty or providing tools that help others deal with uncertainty, be it caused by the lack of information about or the variability of some phenomenon. One of the pillars supporting our activity is the mathematical formalisation of this uncertainty and the rules used to reason with and about it. This paper presents a new consistent mathematical framework for modelling uncertainty and doing basic deductive inference.
Why? To allow us to be more expressive, to unify existing frameworks, and to promote a representation that provides a fresh point of view.
Taking probability measures and the corresponding weak (preference) orders as a baseline, we follow, amongst others, Smith (1961) -who discusses lower and upper probabilities-, in not requiring completeness of the preference order. So what would classically be considered as partially specified uncertainty models are considered proper in our framework. Furthermore, as opposed to the typical derivation of strict preference from non-strict preference (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1986) , or vice versa, our framework allows combining compatible pairs of preference orders where one cannot be derived from the other.
A unified view on different frameworks allows them to be more easily compared, for instance as to their strengths and weaknesses for particular applications, and puts them in a clear mathematical and sometimes even conceptual relation to each other. Walley (1991 Walley ( , 2000 shows how a host of uncertainty models in the literature-including probability theory, of course-can be seen as special cases of coherent lower previsions (expectations), or the even more general coherent sets of desirable gambles. Such a set of desirable gambles can be put into a one-to-one relationship with either a strict or a non-strict (partial) preference order. Our framework goes beyond this, again by its capacity to concurrently model compatible separately specified strict and non-strict preferences.
Modelling uncertainty is most commonly done using probabilities and expectations. In some domains it is not uncommon to use preferences between gambles-real-valued functions that would be called random variables were we to associate a probability measure to its set of values. However, sets of gambles as uncertainty models are rarely encountered in the literature. Smith (1961) uses them as a useful intermediate representation; in the work of Williams (1974 , they become more prominent-he talks about sets of acceptable bets-, but he still keeps a focus on (non-linear) expectation-type models. It is Walley (1991 Walley ( , 2000 -who talks about sets of desirable gambles-who seems to have been the first to discuss them in their own right. We think they deserve to take centre stage because of the way they appeal to geometrical intuition and because of the mathematical advantages they have, which we have experienced ourselves in our own work.
Although our basic setup, and the terminology we use, shows the influence of the subjectivist school of de Finetti, we do not want this to be construed as a constraint. The mathematical results of this paper-its mathematical models and techniques-are applicable under different interpretations, analogously to the role measure theory takes in probability theory. In this context, the 'agent' that provides us with an assessment can, e.g., be seen as a person giving a 'subjective' opinion or a robot that transforms observations such as sample sequences into 'objective' opinions.
Overview
We end this introduction with the basic setup and mathematical notation in Section 1.2.
In Section 2 we build our framework from the ground up. We start by describing the nature of the assessments the agent provides us with (Section 2.1). Then we go over the basic axioms of our framework to end up with a description of what constitutes a model (Sections 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5). Somewhat in parallel, we describe what assessments can be derived from the basic assessments provided by the agent (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Next we investigate specific types of assessment, the most important of which we will call models, from an order-theoretic viewpoint (Section 2.6). This gives us a suitable context in which to frame deductive inference and the compatibility of different assessments (Sections 2.7 and 2.8). We close off this first main part by looking at how assessments and models partition the space of gambles (Section 2.9).
Whereas previously we worked exclusively with sets of gambles, in Section 3 we show that essentially everything carries over when formulating things in terms of preference orders, and we show how.
In Section 4 we return to the set-based formalism to discuss four simplified frameworks. The first two of these still preserve the ability to express two separate preference relations, but not with the same generality as the full framework (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). The last two lose this ability and are mainly included to make correspondences with frameworks we have encountered in the literature (Section 4.3 and 4.4).
Because of their importance, we show in Section 5 how probabilistic models are specific instances of the models of our framework. We start with standard probability theory (Section 5.1), making the connection with previsions (expectation operators). After that (Section 5.2), we move to imprecise-probability theory, where lower previsions form the bridge.
In Section 6 we present an illustrative application of our framework: we show how we can use it to model symmetry assessments in general and finite exchangeability in particular.
We finish with some concluding remarks, musings and topics for further investigation in Section 7.
To improve the readability of the paper, we have gathered the proofs in an appendix.
Basic setup and notation
We consider an agent faced with uncertainty, e.g., about the outcome of some experiment. We assume it is possible to construct a possibility space Ω of mutually exclusive elementary events, e.g., a set of different experimental outcomes, one of which is guaranteed to occur. Formally, a gamble is a real-valued function on the possibility space; as suggested by its name, it represents a-positive or negative-payoff that is uncertain in the sense that it depends on the unknown outcome. These payoffs are assumed to be expressed in units of a linear precise utility. The set of all gambles (Ω ), combined with point-wise addition of gambles and point-wise multiplication with real numbers constitutes a real vector space. We assume the agent is interested in a linear subspace of gambles ℒ ⊆ (Ω ).
We illustrate these concepts for a possibility space Ω ∶= {ω,ϖ}, and take the linear space of gambles to be ℒ ∶= (Ω ), the two-dimensional plane. A gamble f is a vector with two components, f (ω) and f (ϖ). This example format will be used throughout the paper.
The following concepts and notation prove convenient. First, those concerning operations on (sets of) gambles: let f ,g ∈ ℒ and , ′ ⊆ ℒ, then (a) the complement of relative to ℒ is c ∶= ℒ ∖ , (b) the negation of is − ∶= {−g ∶ g ∈ }, (c) the ray through f isf ∶= {λ ⋅ f ∶ λ ∈ R >0 }, (d) the positive scalar hull of is ∶= ⋃ f ∈f , (e) the Minkowski sum of and
(g) the linear span of is span ∶= posi( ∪ − ∪ {0}), the smallest linear space including . Secondly, those for the comparison of gambles, i.e., vector inequalities: let Q be a real-valued operator on ℒ, then
With each of these gamble relations, denote them generically by ◻, we can associate a specific subset of ℒ,
Accept & Reject Statement-Based Uncertainty Models
In this section, we introduce the objects used to represent assessments and models for uncertainty and the basic axioms that order them. This gives rise to a number of important characterisations and provides us with a simple but powerful framework within which there is room for problem-specific a priori assumptions.
Accepting & Rejecting Gambles
We envisage an elicitation procedure where the agent is asked to state whether he would accept or reject different gambles, or remain uncommitted. The acceptability of a gamble f on Ω implies a commitment to engage in the following transaction: (i) the experiment's outcome ω ∈ Ω is determined, (ii) the agent gets the-possibly negative-payoff f (ω). By rejecting a gamble, the agent expresses that he considers accepting that gamble unreasonable. Such statements are, for example, relevant when combining his statements with those of another agent. The agent is not forced to state either acceptance or rejection for a given gamble, but may choose to remain uncommitted, e.g., because of a lack of information about the experiment.
The set of gambles the agent finds acceptable is denoted by ⪰ ⊆ ℒ; the set of gambles he rejects is similarly denoted by ≺ ⊆ ℒ. Combined, they form his assessment ∶= ∐︀ ⪰ ; ≺̃︀ ; the set of all assessments is A ∶= 2
We represent finite assessments graphically in our twodimensional example format using ⊕ for accepted gambles and ⊖ for rejected ones. We give three examples, which will be extended further on.
No Confusion
Based on the statements that have been made about a gamble f , it can fall into one of four categories. It can be only accepted, only rejected, neither accepted nor rejected, or both accepted and rejected. When the gamble is neither accepted nor rejected, it is called unresolved; the set of unresolved gambles is ⌣ ∶= ( ⪰ ∪ ≺ ) c . When the gamble is both accepted and rejected, it is said to be confusing; the set of confusing gambles is ∶= ⪰ ∩ ≺ . Given the interpretation attached to accept and reject statements, we judge confusion to be a situation that has to be avoided. This corresponds to the following rationality axiom:
The set of assessments without confusion is A ∶= { ∈ A ∶ = ∅}. Assessments in A partition the space ℒ of all gambles of interest into { ⪰ , ≺ , ⌣ }. (We allow partition elements to be empty.)
Although sources of confusion should ideally be investigated, it is possible to automatically remove confusion from assessments in a number of ways, of which we mention only a few here.
2.3. Indifference, Favourability, and Incomparability Given an assessment in A, we can introduce three other types of statements an agent can make about gambles by considering both a gamble and its (point-wise) negation.
We say that the agent is indifferent about a gamble f if he finds both it and its negation − f acceptable. The set of indifferent gambles is ≃ ∶= ⪰ ∩ − ⪰ .
We say that the agent finds a gamble f favourable if he finds it acceptable, but rejects its negation − f . The set of favourable gambles is ∶= ⪰ ∩ − ≺ . The zero gamble cannot be favourable without being confusing because −0 = 0.
We say that a gamble f is incomparable if both it and its negation − f are unresolved. (This terminology will be justified in Section 3.) The set of incomparable gambles is ≍ ∶= ⌣ ∩ − ⌣ .
Deductive Closure
Based on the assumption that the gamble payoffs are expressed in a linear precise utility scale, statements of acceptance imply other statements, generated by positive scaling and combination: if f is judged acceptable, then λ ⋅ f should be as well for all real λ > 0; if f and g are judged acceptable, then f + g should be as well. This is called deductive extension. Deductive extension can be succinctly expressed using the positive linear hull operator posi, which generates convex cones. The set of all convex cones in ℒ is C ∶= { ⊆ ℒ ∶ posi = }.
So, starting from an assessment in A, its deductive extension ext D ∶= ∐︀posi ⪰ ; ≺̃︀ , which we call a deductively closed assessment, can be derived. Deductively closed assessments satisfy the following rationality axiom:
This can also be expressed as
Combination:
The subset of A consisting of all deductively closed assessments is-not surprisingly-denoted by D and those without confusion by D ∶= D ∩ A. Not all assessments without confusion remain so after deductive extension; those that do are called deductively closable and form the set A + ∶= { ∈ A ∶ ext D ∈ D}, where we have made use of the fact that ext D never removes statements and therefore cannot remove confusion.
Again, it is possible to automatically remove confusion from deductively closed assessments, but there is less flexibility than for assessments because not all modified assessments suggested in Proposition 1 are deductively closable:
The set of indifferent gambles ≃ of a deductively closed assessment in D is the negation invariant part of the convex cone ⪰ , so it is either empty or a linear space, the cone's so-called lineality space. The set of all linear subspaces of ℒ is L ∶= { ⊆ ℒ ∶ span = }. The lineality space can be used in a pair of useful results:
Applying deductive extension ext D to the three example assessments given in Section 2.1 results in the deductively closed assessments pictured on the right. The area filled light grey is the set of accepted gambles generated by deductive extension, black lines indicate included border rays. We see that the third example assessment is not deductively closable, because after deductive extension one rejected gamble becomes confused.
No Limbo
Deductive Closure does have more of an impact than is apparent at first sight. Consider a deductively closed assessment in D that is the deductive extension of the agent's assessment. Furthermore consider an unresolved gamble f , i.e., f ∈ ⌣ . What happens if the agent makes a statement about this gamble to augment his assessment?
Were f to be rejected, then we would be interested in ext D ∐︀ ⪰ ; ≺ ∪{ f }̃︀, which is just ∐︀ ⪰ ; ≺ ∪{ f }̃︀. Consequently, there is no increase in confusion. On the other hand, were f to be accepted, then we would have to focus on ext D ∐︀ ⪰ ∪ { f }; ≺̃︀ , which is equal to ∐︀ ⪰ ∪ (f + ⪰ ) ∪f ; ≺̃︀ . This new deductively closed assessment may exhibit an increase in confusion:
We say that the gambles in ( ≺ ∖ ⪰ ) − ( ⪰ ∪ {0}) ∖ ≺ are in limbo and we call this set the limbo of . We use this imagery because there is no real choice for the gambles in this set: although they are not rejected yet, the only thing to do is to reject them, if an increase in confusion is to be avoided. Proposition 5 tells us that under Deductive Closure gambles in limbo have exactly the same effect as gambles in ≺ : considering them as acceptable increases confusion.
When the deductively closed assessment we start from satisfies No Confusion, the limbo expression simplifies.
Starting from a deductively closed assessment in D, additionally rejecting the gambles that are in its limbo-i.e., those that would lead to an increase in confusion if added instead to ⪰ -results in its reckoning extension ext M ∶= ∐︁ ⪰ ; ≺ ∪ ( ≺ ∖ ⪰ ) − ( ⪰ ∪ {0}) ︁, which we call a model. Models ℳ are deductively closed assessments that satisfy the following rationality axiom:
The subset of A consisting of all models is denoted by M and those without confusion by M ∶= M ∩ A. By definition, reckoning extension cannot increase or create confusion for deductively closed assessments. This means that for an assessment that is deductively closed and avoids confusion, its reckoning extension ext M is a model without confusion:
When one wants to automatically remove confusion from models, they may be treated as deductively closed assessments, meaning that Proposition 3 provides the appropriate answers. In any case, however they are constructed, models without confusion have some useful additional properties:
Adding anything favourable to something acceptable sweetens the deal to something favourable:
Applying reckoning extension ext M to the three deductively closed example assessments given in Section 2.4 results in the models depicted on the right. The area filled dark grey is the set of rejected gambles implied by No Limbo, dashed black lines emphasise excluded rays. The first two examples illustrate that a model's set of rejected gambles does not have to be convex; in the second example this set is even disconnected. The last example illustrates that reckoning extension only acts on the unconfused parts of a model's set of rejected gambles. In the first example, all acceptable gambles turn out to be favourable as well; for the border rays, this is indicated by dotting them. In the second example, there are no favourable gambles. In the third example, all acceptable gambles are favourable except for one border ray. (Davey and Priestley (1990) provide a good supporting reference for the material in this section.)
Order theoretic considerations
The typical set-theoretic operations-e.g., union ⋃, intersection ⋂, and set difference ∖-are extended to assessments by component-wise application. Pairs of assessments can be compared component-wise using their set-theoretic inclusion relationship. We say that an assessment is at most as committal
as an assessment ℬ if the former's components are included in those of the latter: ⊆ ℬ if and only if ⪰ ⊆ ℬ ⪰ and ≺ ⊆ ℬ ≺ . On the right, this relation is illustrated using the example models we encountered at the end of Section 2.5. The commitment terminology is based on the consequences in the elicitation setup of statements made by the agent (cf. Section 2.1).
Under the 'at most as committal as'-relation ⊆, the set of assessments constitutes a complete lattice (A,⊆), where the union operator ⋃ plays the role of supremum and the intersection operator ⋂ that of infimum. Its bottom is ∶= ∐︀∅;∅̃︀ and its top ⊺ ∶= ∐︀ℒ;ℒ̃︀.
The derived 
The poset (M,⊆) is not an intersection structure. This is shown using the counterexample on the right. The resulting intersection is a deductively closed assessment, but not a model; the corresponding model here-which can be obtained by applying reckoning extension-is actually the second intersection factor. Nevertheless, the poset's bottom is and its top ⊺, the same as for (A,⊆) and (D,⊆).
To summarise the relationships between the sets of assessments we have encountered, we give the Hasse diagram of their inclusion-based partial ordering. We have also indicated which sets are direct images of a superset under deductive closure ext D or reckoning extension ext M . Dashed lines lead to sets of maximal elements.
Let B ∶= {ℬ ∈ B ∶ ⊆ ℬ} be the subset of assessments in B ⊆ A dominating the assessment in A. With every intersection structure (B,⊆) an operator cl B from A to B ∪ {⊺} can be associated, defined for any assessment in A by cl B ∶= ⋂B . For a correct understanding of this definition, recall that ⋂∅ = ⊺.
PROPOSITION 13. Given B ⊆ A, if (B,⊆) is an intersection structure, then cl B is a closure operator and cl B = id only on B ∪ {⊺}, i.e., cl B = if and only if ∈ B ∪ {⊺}.
An operator cl * on A is a closure operator if for all and ℬ in A it is extensive-⊆ cl * -, idempotent-cl * (cl * ) = cl * -, and increasing-⊆ ℬ ⇒ cl * ⊆ cl * ℬ. A closure operator relative to an intersection structure (B,⊆) effects the most conservative inference relative to B in the sense that it generates the least committal dominating assessment in B or-if there is no such dominating assessment-returns ⊺.
With the intersection structures encountered above there correspond the closure operators cl A , cl A , cl A + , cl D , cl D , and cl M . For each of these, we can give a constructive formulation for practical calculations. PROPOSITION 14. Next to the general result of Proposition 13, we have that (i) cl A returns ⊺ outside of A, and is the identity on A, (ii) cl A + returns ⊺ outside of A + , and is the identity on A + ,
Concatenating the closure operators so defined with the supremum operator ⋃ of (A,⊆) gives us the supremum operators of the complete lattices (A ∪ {⊺},⊆), (A + ∪ {⊺},⊆), (D,⊆), (D ∪ {⊺},⊆), and (M ∪ {⊺},⊆) so formed. Supremum operators of special interest are the deductive union ⊎ ∶= cl D ○⋃ and the reckoning union ∶= cl M ○⋃.
Models Dominating Assessments
We want to represent the agent's uncertainty using models in M.
(From now on in this section, unless indicated otherwise, when we talk about models, we mean unconfused ones.) The agent provides an assessment. Unless it is deductively closable, i.e., an element of A + , it is impossible to derive a most conservative model from it using the closure operator cl M -or the operators ext D and ext M -or confusion would ensue (cf. Proposition 14). We are therefore interested in characterisations of A + , the set of assessments that can be turned into models. We consider the sets of models M and maximal modelsM ∶=M∩M dominating the assessment . Both sets are empty if the assessment is not in
, which is the bottom of (M ,⊆). These observations can be strengthened into the following characterisation of A + :
THEOREM 15. Given in A, then ∈ A + if and only ifM ≠ ∅.
COROLLARY 16. If all assessments in some family are dominated by a common model, then their reckoning union is a model.
The maximal models dominating an assessment can also be used for inference purposes:
The results in this section guarantee that models constitute an instance of what are called strong belief structures by De Cooman (2005) . This implies in particular that the whole apparatus developed there for dealing with AGM-style belief change and belief revision, is also available for the models we are dealing with here.
Positing a Background Model
So far, we have not dealt with any structural a priori assumptions about the gambles in ℒ or the experiment. Many of these can be captured by positing a so-called background model ∈ M to replace the trivial smallest model . In such a context, attention is evidently restricted to models in M , and when doing so, all the results of the preceding sections remain valid, mutatis mutandis. An intuitively appealing background model is ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ . Using this background model amounts to taking for granted that all nonnegative gambles should be accepted, and all negative gambles rejected. For other examples, we refer to Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 5.
We say that an assessment ∈ A respects the background model if they share a common maximal model; i.e., ifM ∩M =M ∪ ≠ ∅. The natural extension of an assessment ∈ A is its reckoning union with the background model, . Corollary 16 then leads to:
COROLLARY 18. The natural extension of an assessment is a model if and only if the assessment respects the background model.
We say that an assessment ∈ A + is coherent if it coincides with its natural extension: = , or equivalently ⊆ cl M = .
To make explicit what the linear space ℒ of gambles of interest is or what the background model is, these can be used as a prefix: (ℒ, )-coherent, ℒ-coherent, -coherent.
Given the interpretation attached to accept statements, we judge it reasonable to always let the zero gamble 0-also called status quo-be acceptable, and therefore indifferent. This corresponds to the following rationality axiom:
Indifference to Status Quo: ⊆ , with ∶= ∐︀{0};∅̃︀.
The set of assessments that express Indifference to Status Quo is A . Under Indifference to Status Quo, the limbo expression simplifies yet further (cf. Corollary 6).
It is possible to give a compact characterisation of models without confusion respecting a background model that is indifferent to status quo:
Gamble Space Partitions Induced by Assessments with No Confusion
In our accept-reject framework, an assessment ∈ A-so with no confusion-partitions the linear space of gambles of interest ℒ into nine classes, each of which is defined by whether its constituent gambles and their negations are acceptable, rejected, or unresolved. Some of these classes may be empty. This partitioning is illustrated on the right.
From Proposition 12, we know that for maximal models all gambles in ℒ are either accepted or rejected. Because of this, for maximal models, some partition classes are empty for sure; these have been given a lighter shade. Whenever a background model has been posited, the picture stays the same, but the background model constrains some or all of the partition classes to be non-empty.
Gamble Relations
We associate a number of gamble relations on ℒ × ℒ with each model with Indifference to Status Quo in our accept-reject framework. So, fix a model ℳ in M and consider the following defining equivalences:
The former can be read as ' f is accepted in exchange for g', the latter as ' f is dispreferred to g'. The nature of these gamble relations follows from the axioms of the accept-reject framework: No Confusion (1), Deductive Closure (2), No Limbo (5), and Indifference to Status Quo (6). We give a translation of these axioms for gamble relations under the form of a characterisation in the vein of Proposition 20: PROPOSITION 21. Given gamble relations ⪰ and ≺ on ℒ × ℒ, then these are equivalent under Definition (7) to a model ℳ in M if and only if for all f , g, and h in ℒ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 it holds that
So acceptability is reflexive and transitive, which makes it a non-strict pre-order, also a vector ordering. Dispreference is irreflexive. Both gamble relations are linked together by Mixed Transitivity.
The two definitions of Equation (7) engender three other useful gamble relations: We say that the agent is indifferent between two gambles f and g if he accepts f in exchange for g and vice versa:
Because it is the symmetrisation of the reflexive and transitive acceptability ⪰, indifference is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, which makes it an equivalence relation. We say that the agent prefers a gamble f over a gamble g if he both accepts f in exchange for g and disprefers g to f :
Because of how it is derived from dispreference ≺ and acceptability ⪰, and because of Proposition 8 and Corollary 9, preference satisfies the following properties for all f , g, and h in ℒ and 0 < µ ≤ 1:
Weakening:
Favour Irreflexivity:
Favour Transitivity:
Mixed Transitivity:
Mixture Independence:
So preference is irreflexive and transitive (and therefore also antisymmetric), which makes it a strict partial ordering. This, together with the interpretation attached to the accept and reject type statements from which it derives, makes it ideally suited for decision making. We say that two gambles f and g are incomparable when neither of their differences is resolved:
Incomparability is by definition symmetric, but is irreflexive because of Accept Reflexivity. Moreover, in general it will not be transitive. For all the gamble relations introduced above, denote them generically by ◻, the following property follows from Mixture Independence with h = −g and µ = 1 2 :
This property can be considered as a conceptual intermediate step when moving between gamble relations and models using Equations (7), (8), (9), and (15).
The connection between models and the gamble relations of this section is illustrated on the right. In the wide figure, we have that f g, f ⪰ 2 ⋅ g, f ≍ 3 ⋅ g, and f ≺ 4 ⋅ g; in the slim figure that f ′ ≃ g ′ .
Let us denote the gamble relations corresponding to a background model in M by ⊵ for acceptability and ⊲ for dispreference. This provides a baseline assessment that the agent can augment, resulting-if all goes well-in a model ℳ in M with which, as above, we associate the gamble relations ⪰ and ≺. Respect of the model ℳ for the background model can then be expressed in terms of the gamble relations by
For example, when using ∶= ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ , we have ⊵ = ≥ and ⊲ = <, which supports the name 'Monotonicity' even more than the suggestive notation used.
Simplified Frameworks
The accept-reject framework of Section 2 may in many situations be more general than needed. Therefore, it is interesting to have a look at simplified versions of this framework. By 'simplified', we mean that we add additional restrictions on the statements the agent is allowed to make, so that the models that result become easier to work with or characterise.
The most simplified frameworks we consider here essentially restrict assessments in terms of either favourability or acceptability statements. They allow us to make the connection with other frameworks for modelling uncertainty that are also based on statements about gambles.
The Accept-Favour Framework
On the left we give the illustration of the six-element partition that results if we simplify our framework by restricting reject statements to negated acceptable gambles by imposing
In such a context, the rejection of a gamble f in ℒ can be viewed as an explicit statement of favourability about the gamble's negation − f , because then
It is therefore immaterial whether we specify an assessment by providing the sets ⪰ and ≺ , or by the sets ⪰ and ; in this situation we say we are using the accept-favour framework. Given B ⊆ A, we define its subset of assessments satisfying Condition (18) by B ∶= { ∈ B ∶ − ≺ ⊆ ⪰ }. The results of Sections 2.2 to 2.5 of course also remain valid when restricting attention to A. It is useful to state a more specific version of one result:
We furthermore wish the results of Sections 2.6 to 2.8 to have counterparts in the accept-favour framework. The following results take care of this:
PROPOSITION 24 (CF. PROPOSITION 11).Â = A ∩Â = {∐︀ ;ℒ ∖̃︀ ∶ ⊆ ℒ ∧ −(ℒ ∖ ) ⊆ }, and given inÂ, then ⊆ .
PROPOSITION 25 (CF. PROPOSITION 12).M =D =Â
We also consider the set of maximal modelsM ∶=M ∩ M that dominate the assessment ∈ A and satisfy Condition (18).
THEOREM 27 (CF. THEOREM 15). Given in A, then ∈ A + if and only ifM ≠ ∅.
We would also like to prove that here too, the maximal models dominating an assessment can be used for inference purposes, in a result similar to Proposition 17. But since in the accept-favour framework every maximal model satisfies Indifference to Status Quo by Proposition 24, no model without Indifference to Status Quo can ever be the intersection of the maximal models inM that dominate it.
Again it is possible to give a compact characterisation of models without confusion respecting a background model that is indifferent to status quo. But now, in the accept-favour framework, we can refocus attention from rejected to favoured gambles. 
The Favour-Indifference Framework
On the left we give the illustration of the four-element partition that results if we further simplify the accept-favour framework by restricting accept statements to either favourability statements or indifference statements by imposing, in addition to Condition (18) that:
In such a context, no non-incomparable unresolved gambles can exist, because these two statements both say something about a gamble f and its negation − f concurrently. It is therefore immaterial whether we specify an assessment by providing the sets ⪰ and ≺ , or by the sets and ≃ ; in this situation we say we are using the favour-indifference framework. Given B ⊆ A, then define B ∶= { ∈ B ∶ − ≺ ⊆ ⪰ ∧ ⪰ = ∪ ≃ } ⊆ B as its subset of assessments satisfying Conditions (18) and (19). Again, the results of Sections 2.2 to 2.5 also remain valid when restricting attention to Ã. It is useful to make a more specific version of one result: PROPOSITION 30 (CF. PROPOSITION 2). Given an assessment in Ã, then ∈ Ã + if and only if
∩ =
The poset (Ã,⊆) is not an intersection structure. This can be shown using the graphical counterexample on the right. The resulting intersection-of two elements of M ⊆ Ã-does not satisfy Condition (19) any more: it has (border) gambles that are acceptable without being either favourable or indifferent. However, by investigating the effect of cl M , some interesting conclusions can still be drawn.
PROPOSITION 31. Given in Ã + , then ℳ ∶= cl M ∈ M with defining components ℳ ≃ = span ≃ and
As we did in the accept-favour framework, it is possible to give a compact characterisation of models without confusion respecting a background model that is indifferent to status quo. But now, in the favourindifference framework, we can refocus attention from accepted to indifferent gambles.
PROPOSITION 32 (CF. PROPOSITION 29). Given ℳ in Ã and in M , then ℳ ∈ M if and only if
The Favourability Framework & its Appearance in the Literature
To work towards types of models encountered in the literature, we look at the special case where the agent only makes favourability statements forming a set ⊂ ℒ, but where there is a favour-indifference background model ∈ M , so one that satisfies (FI1)-(FI4) . The resulting favourability framework is a restriction of the favour-indifference framework. To know what the models in this framework look like, we The illustration of the four-element partition of gamble space corresponding to a model ℳ in the favourability framework with background model is given on the right.
The focus in this framework's characterisation result lies on the set of favourable gambles:
The simplest case occurs when we take ≃ = {0}; should then by ( while eking out some issues about moving between convex sets of probability measures and strict preference orders-and indeed their work fits right in the favourability framework.
• Walley (1991, §3.7.8) discusses 'strictly desirable' gambles (with ℒ any linear space containing constant gambles). An openness axiom is added for prevision-equivalence (cf. Section 5): ℳ ∖ ⊆ ℳ + R >0 .
• Walley (2000, §6) advocates a desirability framework that is more elaborately discussed, but essentially equivalent to Seidenfeld et al.'s 'favorable' gambles, but without the focus on finite Ω . This framework also corresponds to his 'strictly desirable' gambles without the extra openness axiom. De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) use and extend the framework of Walley (2000, §6) to study exchangeability. Actually, we feel the accept-reject framework is a more natural setting for such a study. Therefore we repeat it in Section 6 for the restricted finite exchangeability case (cf. De Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2009) as an illustrative application, where both and ≃ are non-trivial. The unconfused models of a favourability framework with a fixed background model actually form an intersection structure, in contrast to the situation for the general favour-indifference framework of the previous section. Order-theoretic results and results about maximal elements can be found in the work of De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) and Couso and Moral (2011) .
The Acceptability Framework & its Appearance in the Literature
Again to work towards types of models encountered in the literature, we look at the special case where the agent only makes acceptability statements forming a set ⪰ ⊂ ℒ, but where there is an accept-reject background model ∈ M , so one that satisfies (AR1)-(AR4). The resulting acceptability framework is a restriction of the accept-reject framework. To know what the models in this framework look like, we The illustration of the nine-element partition of gamble space corresponding to a model ℳ in the acceptability framework with background model is given on the right. The focus in this framework's characterisation result lies on the set of acceptable gambles:
When ≺ ⊆ − ⪰ , the resulting models will also belong to the accept-favour framework (cf. Section 4.1). This is actually the case for all acceptability-type frameworks we are aware of in the literature:
• Williams (1974, §IV) talks about 'acceptable bets' (with ℒ the set of simple functions with as a basis the indicator functions of the elements of a set ℰ of subsets of Ω including Ω ). The background model he uses is ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ . He does not require Indifference to Status Quo. extends the previous work to include conditional models. (He now lets ℒ be any linear space including constant gambles.) To deal with conditional models nicely, he uses a larger background model ⋃ ∅⊂E⊆Ω E , where each E is defined by
This union of models is still a model because ( E ) ⪰ + ( F ) ⪰ ⊂ ( E∪F ) ⪰ for all non-empty events E and F.
• Walley (1991, §3.7.3) discusses 'almost desirable' gambles (with ℒ any linear space containing constant gambles). The background model here is ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ . A closure axiom is added for previsionequivalence:
• Walley (1991, App. F) talks about 'really desirable' gambles (with ℒ any linear space containing constant gambles). The background model here is ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ . Normally, given a not necessarily finite partition ℰ of Ω and some f in ℒ such that f I E ∈ ℳ ⪰ for all E in ℰ, then Deductive Closure implies f I ⋃ ℱ ∈ ℳ ⪰ for all finite subsets ℱ of ℰ. (Here I E is the indicator of the event E, i.e., the gamble that is 1 on E and 0 elsewhere.) He imposes a conglomerability axiom that says that under those conditions f ∈ ℳ ⪰ should hold.
Linear & Lower Previsions
In this section, we discuss how our framework can be connected to that most popular framework for modelling uncertainty: probability theory. Given the fact that we have been dealing with gambles, i.e., real-valued functions on the possibility space Ω , and not with events, the most natural way to make this connection is via expectation operators and not probability measures (cf. Whittle, 1992) . Because of our own background, we will call expectation operators previsions (cf. de Finetti, , 1975 . As has been argued by many, restricting attention to precise probabilities (and thus previsions) limits our expression power in modelling uncertainty (e.g., Keynes, 1921; Koopman, 1940; Good, 1952; Smith, 1961; Dempster, 1967; Suppes, 1974; Shafer, 1976; Levi, 1980; Walley, 1991 , and references therein). It turns out that our framework is sufficiently general to connect it with the theories that have been proposed to provide added expressivity; we focus on the so-called imprecise-probabilistic theory of coherent lower previsions (for more information, see Walley, 1991; Miranda, 2008) .
Throughout this section it is convenient to assume that the linear space of gambles of interest ℒ contains the constant gambles, which are identified by their constant value for notational convenience.
Linear Previsions
In de Finetti's theory, the agent's prevision P f for a gamble f is a real number seen as his fair price for it. This can be interpreted in two ways: The first-which de Finetti (1975, §3.1.4) seems to have had in mind-is that f ≃ P f , i.e., that the agent is indifferent between f and P f , which is seen as a constant gamble; this means that he is willing to exchange either one for the other. The second-which Walley (1991, §2.3.6) seems to have kept in mind-is that { f − P f } + R > and {P f − f } + R > are sets of acceptable gambles for the agent, which means that he is willing to buy f for any price strictly lower than P f and sell it for any price strictly higher.
De Finetti's coherent previsions, when defined on the whole of ℒ, can be characterised as real linear functionals that satisfy inf f ≤ P f ≤ sup f for any f in ℒ (de Finetti, 1975, §3.1.5). This means any such prevision P partitions ℒ into (i) ℒ > P ∶= {h ∈ ℒ ∶ Ph > 0}, which always includes ℒ ⋗ ∶= {h ∈ ℒ ∶ infh > 0}, (ii) ℒ < P ∶= {h ∈ ℒ ∶ Ph < 0}, which always includes ℒ ⋖ ∶= {h ∈ ℒ ∶ suph < 0}, and (iii) ℒ = P ∶= {h ∈ ℒ ∶ Ph = 0}, which always contains 0; its elements are called marginal gambles and f −P f and P f − f are the marginal gambles corresponding to f . Because of the linearity of P, ℒ > P and ℒ < P are convex cones related by negation-i.e., ℒ > P = −ℒ < P -
and ℒ = P is a linear space; the line segment joining any element of ℒ > P to any element of ℒ < P always intersects ℒ = P . The associated mental image is that of a hyperplane ℒ = P separating the (open) positive orthant ℒ ⋗ from the (open) negative one ℒ ⋖ . This partitioning is illustrated above right for some linear prevision P. Because { f − P f ∶ f ∈ ℒ} = ℒ = P , the assessment corresponding to P under the first interpretation is ∐︀ℒ = P ;∅̃︀ and the one under the second interpretation is ∐︀ℒ > P ;∅̃︀, because any gamble f in ℒ > P can be decomposed into f − P f ∈ ℒ = P and P f ∈ R > . Moreover, violation of inf f ≤ P f ≤ sup f occurs when either sup( f − P f ) < 0 or inf( f − P f ) > 0, i.e., whenever f − P f is an element of ℒ ⋖ or ℒ ⋗ . Under the first interpretation this means that no element of either may be indifferent, which under our interpretation of accept and reject statements (cf. Section 2.1) implies that ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ is part of the background model . Under the second interpretation this means that no element of ℒ ⋖ may be acceptable, so in that case ∐︀∅;ℒ ⋖̃︀ must be part of the background model . So, under the first interpretation we associate the model cl M ∐︀ℒ = P ∪ ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ = ∐︀ℒ = P ∪ ℒ > P ;ℒ < P̃︀ with a coherent prevision P, where the equality follows from the fact that any gamble f in ℒ can be decomposed into f − P f ∈ ℒ = P and P f ∈ {0} ∪ ℒ ⋗ ∪ ℒ ⋖ ; this is a maximal model (cf. Proposition 12). The model associated with P under the second interpretation is P ∶= cl M ∐︀ℒ > P ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ = ∐︀ℒ > P ;ℒ < P̃︀ , where the equality follows from reckoning extension and the fact that ℒ ⋖ ⊆ ℒ < P . The second interpretation leads to a model that is less committal than the one resulting from the first interpretation. † To not record any commitments † Wagner (2007) argues for the second interpretation by pointing out that it avoids vulnerability to a weak Dutch book (cf. Shimony, 1955) . The commitments implied by the different models associated with both interpretations make the reason for this explicit. the agent might not have wanted to make when specifying the prevision, we continue with the second interpretation.
What is the background model associated with the set of all coherent previsions on ℒ? At face value, this question asks what assessment is shared by every model associated with a coherent prevision; the next proposition answers this: PROPOSITION 37. ⋂ P∈ P = ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ . Going beyond its literal meaning, the question leads us to consider which models are compatible as background models with the set of all coherent previsions on ℒ. To wit, which are such that for any P in , P can still be put into one-to-one correspondence with P? The remainder of this section is devoted to providing a cogent answer to this question.
There is a one-to-one relation between P and P that follows from the decomposition of any f in ℒ into f − P f ∈ ℒ = P and P f ∈ R. We know there are other such models, e.g., ∐︀ℒ = P ∪ ℒ > P ;ℒ < P̃︀ .
PROPOSITION 38. Given P and Q in , then M P ∩ M Q ≠ ∅ if and only if P = Q.
So any coherent prevision P can be uniquely identified with some element of M P . This means that any in M ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ is a compatible background model if M P ∩ M is non-empty for all P in . PROPOSITION 39. Given in M ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ and P in , then M P ∩ M ≠ ∅ if and only if ⊂ ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ .
So we find that the background model must satisfy ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ ⊆ ⊂ ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ for us to consider it compatible with the theory of coherent previsions.
Up until now, we have looked at previsions defined on the whole of ℒ. The procedure we used to generate an assessment-calling gambles uniformly dominating marginal gambles acceptable-can be used equally well for previsions defined on a subset of ℒ. The interesting issues that would arise when discussing such non-exhaustively specified linear previsions arise as well when treating coherent lower previsions, which give their user even more control over the commitments specified. Therefore we move on to that topic.
Lower Previsions
In Walley's theory of coherent lower previsions, the agent's lower prevision P f for a gamble f is a real number seen as his supremum buying price for it (Walley, 1991, §2.3.1) . The interpretation is that { f − P f } + R > is a set of acceptable gambles, which means that he is willing to buy f for any price strictly lower than P f (Walley, 1991, §2.3.4) . Again, f − P f is called the marginal gamble associated with f . Upper previsions P f are seen as infimum acceptable buying prices and because of this are conjugate to lower previsions, i.e., P f = −P(− f ) (Walley, 1991, §2.3.5) ; therefore it is sufficient to develop the theory in terms of lower previsions. Linear previsions are lower previsions that are self-conjugate, i.e., that coincide with their conjugate upper prevision.
Walley's coherent lower previsions, when defined on a subset of ℒ, can be characterised as follows: a lower prevision P on is coherent if and only if inf h∈ P inf g∈posi P sup(g − h) ≥ 0 (adapted from Walley, 1991, §2.5 .1), where we conveniently used the set of marginal gambles P ∶= { f − P f ∶ f ∈ }. This is a weaker criterion than the one for linear previsions; however, it implies, among other things, that inf f ≤ P f ≤ sup f for any f in and that P is point-wise dominated by some linear prevision (Walley, 1991, §2.6.1 and §3.3.3) . So the results of the previous section concerning compatible background models in M are carried over; they must satisfy ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ ⊆ ⊂ ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ .
So the assessment we associate with a lower prevision P is P ∶= ∐︀ P + R > ;∅̃︀, resulting in a model ℳ P ∶= P by natural extension.
PROPOSITION 40. ℳ P avoids confusion if and only if P avoids sure loss, i.e., if inf g∈posi P supg ≥ 0. In that case ℳ P = ∐︀posi P + ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖ − posi P̃︀ ∪ .
As an aside, notice that P is an assessment consisting purely of acceptability statements; so by taking in M , we see that modelling uncertainty using previsions can be seen as working in the acceptability framework of Section 4.4. Moreover, notice-making abstraction of -that ℳ P consists purely of favourability statements and that we could strengthen every acceptability statement in P to a favourability statement with the resulting model still being equal to ℳ P . So modelling uncertainty using previsions can also be seen as working in the favourability framework of Section 4.3.
We now know how to associate a model with a lower prevision. It is also possible to move in the other direction: given a model ℳ in M ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ , we can derive a coherent lower prevision P ℳ . The translation rule is based on the interpretation of the lower prevision for a gamble f in ℒ as a supremum acceptable buying price:
PROPOSITION 41. Given in M such that ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ ⊆ ⊂ ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ , then P = inf.
The rules for moving between models and lower previsions preserve the most commitments possible without adding any new ones; this is made explicit by the following results:
(This result is illustrated above right for a model ℳ in M ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ .) PROPOSITION 43. Given a non-empty set ⊆ ℒ and a lower prevision P on , then (i) P ℳ P f = sup g∈posi P inf( f − g) for any f in ℒ, (ii) P ℳ P ≥ P on , and (iii) P ℳ P = P on if and only if P is coherent.
For incoherent lower previsions P on that avoid sure loss, we see that there are some gambles f such that P ℳ P f > P f . This is a consequence of the fact that the commitments encoded in P have not been fully taken into account in the specification of gambles such as f ; they are in P ℳ P .
An Application: Dealing with Symmetry
Consider a monoid of transformations of the possibility space Ω . With any gamble f and any transformation T ∈ , there corresponds a transformed gamble T t f defined by
In the background, we assume all positive gambles (ℒ > ) to be favourable. We also assume that there is some symmetry, represented by the (non-empty) monoid , associated with the experiment, which leads the agent to be indifferent between any gamble f and its transformation T t f . This gives rise to the background set of indifferent gambles
What is the background model corresponding to such a background assessment and when does it lead to No Confusion? PROPOSITION 44. ∶= ∐︀ℒ ;∅̃︀ ∐︀ℒ > ;ℒ <̃︀ = ∐︀ℒ ∪ (ℒ + ℒ > );ℒ + ℒ <̃︀ ∈ M if and only if f < 0 for no f in ℒ . ‡ ‡ The condition of this proposition is closely related to the necessary and sufficient condition for the left-amenability of the monoid -i.e., the existence of a -invariant linear prevision on ℒ-that sup f ≥ 0 for all f in ℒ (cf. Greenleaf, 1969; Walley, 1991) . The fact that our condition is slightly stronger should come as no surprise, as we have seen in Section 5.1 that previsions cannot express the distinction between sup f ≥ 0 and f > 0.
When working in a favourability framework using as the background model, the extension of assessments is governed by the following result:
COROLLARY 45 (CF. PROPOSITION 33). Given ⊆ ℒ and , then ∶= ∐︀ ;− ︀ respects if and only if 0 ∉ ℒ + posi(ℒ > ∪ ). In that case, the natural extension ℳ ∶= ∈ M has defining components ℳ ≃ = ℒ and ℳ = ℒ + posi(ℒ > ∪ ), so that ℳ = ∐︀ℒ ∪ ℳ ;−ℳ ︀.
Furthermore, in this context, models can be characterised as follows:
An interesting special case obtains when the set of transformations is in particular a finite group Π of permutations of Ω , in which case the condition of Proposition 44 always holds. The Π -invariant atoms (︀ω⌋︀ Π ∶= {πω ∶ π ∈ Π }, ω ∈ Ω are the smallest subsets of Ω that are invariant under all permutations π ∈ Π , and they constitute a partition of Ω . A gamble f on Ω is invariant under all permutations in Π -or simply, Π -invariant-if and only if it is constant on this partition. We denote by ℐ Π the linear subspace of all Π -invariant gambles in ℒ.
If we denote by avg Π the linear transformation of ℒ defined for all f in ℒ by ∑ π∈Π π t f ⇑⋃︀Π ⋃︀, then avg Π is a projection operator-meaning that avg Π ○avg Π = avg Π -satisfying avg Π ○π t = π t ○ avg Π = avg Π for all π in Π . This in turn implies that its range is the set ℐ Π of all Π -invariant gambles, and its kernel is the set ℒ Π . The projection operator avg Π allows for a simple representation result: if ℳ satisfies (F 1)-(F 4), then f ∈ ℳ if and only if avg Π f ∈ ℳ . So the set ℳ is completely characterised by its projection avg Π ℳ on the lower-dimensional linear space ℐ Π .
De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012, 2009 ) discuss the special case where Ω ∶= n is the set of length-n sequences of samples in a finite set , and Π is the group of all permutations of such sequences obtained by permuting their indices. Stating indifference between a gamble on sequences and all those gambles related by sequence-index permutations corresponds to an exchangeability assumption, and the above-mentioned representation result is then a significant generalisation of de Finetti's (1937) representation theorem for finite exchangeable sequences in terms of hypergeometric distributions-sampling from an urn without replacement: indeed, for any gamble f the constant value of avg Π f on an invariant atom turns out to be the hypergeometric expectation of f associated with that atom. This result can be extended to infinite exchangeable sequences as well (De Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2012, 2010) . The more general discussion above also includes the case of partial exchangeability.
Conclusions
We started out this paper by claiming that our framework allows us to be more expressive and that it has a unifying character. This is already apparent in the elicitation step; we can directly incorporate assessments of various natures: of course accept and reject statements, but also statements of indifference and favourability, and the preference relation counterparts of all these statements; even (imprecise) probabilistic statements pose no problem. Naturally, all these types of statements can also be used on the output side. Between input and output, we know how to transform mere assessments into models that satisfy a number of-according to our judgement, in many contexts reasonable-rationality requirements, or detect whether the assessments contain inconsistencies that make this impossible.
We hope that the basic theory of this paper will be a starting point for further research and numerous applications, both theoretical and practical. For it to be usable in practice, we of course need computational tools that, given an assessment, produce inferences of the various types described above. An algorithm that does the core computations needed (on finite possibility spaces) has recently been devised (Quaeghebeur, 2012) , so that hurdle has in large part been taken. Furthermore, conditional and marginal models must be defined, and rules for deriving and combining them must be formulated. Again, we can expect that quite a bit of work for this has essentially been done already: much can be carried over from the literature on coherent sets of desirable gambles (see, e.g., Quaeghebeur, 2013; De Cooman and Miranda, 2011) , which itself builds on the much larger corpus on coherent lower previsions.
As regards comparisons with other frameworks in the literature: the approach using credal sets (sets of linear previsions) deserves attention. We know that closed convex credal sets are equivalent to coherent lower previsions, but once closure is not required, we can deduce from polytope-theoretic duality properties that only a subclass of such models can be described within our framework (cf. Quaeghebeur, 2013) . It would, however, be useful to know exactly what subclass of credal sets can be equivalently described using our models, so that we may also know what type of information they cannot represent.
On the technical side, investigating topological properties of the objects in our framework would be useful to able to deal with questions prompted by our simple illustrative examples, such as, e.g., 'Is the interior of the set of acceptable gambles always favourable whenever the set of rejected gambles is not empty?' Also, we have not put any restrictions on the possibility space in our exposition, but for finite possibility spaces it should be possible to formulate construcive counterparts for some proofs; e.g., so that we may construct maximal models dominating an assessment, instead of essentially just positing their existence.
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Proofs

PROOF (PROPOSITION 3). ext
◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 4). The first claim is a direct consequence of Lemma 47 and ⪰ ∈ C. Because ⪰ ∈ C and ⪰ ∖ ≃ , ≃ ⊆ ⪰ , we know that
For the second claim, we know that ( ⪰ ∖ ≃ ) + ≃ ⊇ ⪰ ∖ ≃ because 0 ∈ ≃ . Now assume ex absurdo that the reverse inclusion does not hold, then ( ⪰ ∖ ≃ ) + ≃ ∩ ≃ ≠ ∅, from which the contradictory ( ⪰ ∖ ≃ ) ∩ ≃ ≠ ∅ follows by Lemma 48 and the fact that ≃ − ≃ = ≃ because ≃ ∈ L. For the third claim, positive scaling (3) is generally preserved under set difference. Now assume ex absurdo that combination (4) does not hold, then 
PROOF (LEMMA 48). Applying Lemma 47 twice, we find that The claimed disjunction is
PROOF (LEMMA 49). The identity's left-hand side is equal to
, which is equal to its right-hand side.
◻
PROOF (LEMMA 50). Any left-hand side element can be written as λ ⋅ ( f + g), with f ∈ , g ∈ ′ , and
PROOF (LEMMA 51). Any left-hand side element can be written as λ ⋅ f , with f ∈ ′ , f ∉ , and λ > 0.
But then also λ ⋅ f ∉ , for otherwise f ∈ by = . So λ ⋅ f is also a right-hand side element. Conversely, for any right-hand side element f , so with f ∈ ′ and f ∉ , it holds for any λ > 0 that λ ⋅ f ∈ ′ and λ ⋅ f ∉ by = . So then f = λ −1 ⋅ (λ ⋅ f ) is also a left-hand side element.
PROOF (PROPOSITION 7). Since avoids confusion and
No Confusion follows from the disjointness property of Proposition 5. ◻
PROOF (PROPOSITION 8).
Because ℳ avoids confusion, we infer from Proposition 7 that it satisfies
The converse inequality and thus equality follows from the fact that f ∈ ℳ implies that f ∈ ℳ ⪰ and − f ∈ ℳ ≺ , and therefore by positive scaling that f ⇑2 ∈ ℳ ⪰ and − f ⇑2 ∈ ℳ ≺ , so that f ∈ ℳ ⪰ − ℳ ≺ . Now ℳ ∈ C if and only if posi
We can therefore finish the proof by applying Lemma 52 with ∶= −ℳ ≺ and
PROOF (LEMMA 52). Given the nature of and ′ , and the definition of Minkowski addition, we
So we now only need to prove combination: let f 1 , f 2 ∈ and
f 1 ∈ and g 1 + ( f 2 + g 2 ) ∈ ′ , which follows from ′ being a convex cone. ◻ PROOF (COROLLARY 9). By definition, ℳ ⊆ ℳ ⪰ , which gives a first result ℳ + ℳ ⪰ ⊆ ℳ ⪰ on its own and together with Proposition 8-ℳ ∈ C and therefore ℳ + ℳ = ℳ -results in one direction of the equality of the claim: ℳ + ℳ ⪰ ⊇ ℳ + ℳ = ℳ . For the other direction of the equality we again apply Proposition 8: 
Deductive Closure is preserved because arbitrary intersections of convex cones are still convex cones and a deductively closed assessment is just required to have a convex cone as a set of acceptable gambles. For No Limbo, consider any non-empty family K ⊆ M, so with PROPOSITION 11) . Apply Lemma 53 with C ∶= A, B ∶= {∐︀ ;ℒ ∖̃︀ ∶ ⊆ ℒ} ⊆ A-for whicĥ B = B by construction-, and ℬ ∶= ∪ ∐︀ ⌣ ;∅̃︀. ◻ LEMMA 53. Given B,C ⊆ A, thenĈ = C ∩B if for all in C there is a ℬ in C ∩B such that ⊆ ℬ.
PROOF (LEMMA 53). Consider ∈ C ∩B and ′ ∈ C such that ⊆ ′ , then there is a ℬ in C ∩B such that ′ ⊆ ℬ and therefore ⊆ ℬ. Since ,ℬ ∈B we find = ′ = ℬ and therefore ∈Ĉ: C ∩B ⊆Ĉ.
Conversely, consider ∈Ĉ, then there is a ℬ in C ∩B such that ⊆ ℬ and therefore = ℬ ∈ C ∩B: 
To complete the proof, we have to show that ext D on A and ext M on D generate, respectively, the least committal dominating deductively closed assessments and unconfused models. That they respectively generate dominating deductively closed assessments and unconfused models follows from their definition. That these are the least committal ones follows from the definition of deductively closed assessments and models, Deductive Closure (2) and No Limbo (5) 
In the former case, let ∶= ℳ ∐︀∅;{ f }̃︀, in the latter case, let ∶= ℳ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀. Using Lemma 54, we know that ∈ M. Then ℳ ⊆ , but is not dominated by any element ofM ℳ , a contradiction. ◻ LEMMA 54. Given ℳ in M and a gamble f in ℳ ⌣ , then ℳ ∐︀∅;{ f }̃︀,ℳ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀ ⊆ M.
PROOF (LEMMA 54). We just need to show that ℳ ⊎ ∐︀∅;{ f }̃︀,ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀ ⊆ D thanks to Proposition 14. Now, ℳ ∪ ∐︀∅;{ f }̃︀ already belongs to D because deductive closure only acts on the acceptable gambles of an assessment; it avoids confusion by choice of f . For ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀ we can apply Corollary 6, for which the condition is trivially satisfied because ℳ, being a model, has no limbo. ◻ , and (AD4) are respectively equivalent under Definition (7) to (AR1)-using ∶= -, (AR2), and (AR4). We split (AR3) into Combination (4) and Scaling (3); the former is equivalent under Definition (7) to (AD3). For the latter, (AD5) (7)-implies (3) by applying it with g ∶= 0 and h ∶= 0 and by considering µ ∶= λ for λ ≤ 1 and µ ∶= 1⇑λ with f ′ ∶= f ⇑µ for λ > 1; (3) (7)-implies (AD5) because 
PROOF (LEMMA 55). Let
∈ A, then − ≺ ⊆ ⪰ ⊆ posi ⪰ proves this for ext D . Let ∈ D, then − ( ≺ ∖ ⪰ ) − ( ⪰ ∪ {0}) ⊆ ⪰ + ( ⪰ ∪ {0}) ⊆ ⪰ proves it for ext M . ◻
PROOF (PROPOSITION 23)
. We need to show that Condition (18) 
PROOF (PROPOSITION 28
). The first equality follows from Proposition 14. Let ℳ ∶= cl M ; we then know that ℳ ∈ M andM ℳ =M . So it is sufficient to prove for all ℳ ∈ M that ℳ = ⋂Mℳ. The definition ofM ℳ tells us that ℳ ⊆ ⋂Mℳ. Assume ex absurdo that ℳ ≠ ⋂Mℳ, so ℳ ⪰ ⊂ (⋂M ℳ ) ⪰ or ℳ ⊂ (⋂M ℳ ) ; then there is some f in ℳ ⌣ such that either f ∈ (⋂M ℳ ) ⪰ or − f ∈ (⋂M ℳ ) . In the former case, let ∶= ℳ ∐︀{− f };{ f }̃︀, in the latter case, let ∶= ℳ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀. Using Lemma 58, we know that ∈ M . Then ℳ ⊆ , but is not dominated by any element ofM ℳ , a contradiction. ◻ LEMMA 58. Given ℳ in M and f in ℳ ⌣ , then {ℳ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀,ℳ ∐︀{− f };{ f }̃︀} ⊆ M . PROOF (LEMMA 58). Thanks to Propositions 14 and 26, it suffices to check that ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀ and ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{− f };{ f }̃︀ satisfy Condition (18)-which follows from Lemma 55-and avoid confusion-which for ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{ f };∅̃︀ follows from Lemma 54. So we are finished once we verify that ℳ ⊎ ∐︀{− f };{ f }̃︀ avoids confusion. Its set of confusing gambles is (ℳ ≺ ∪ { f }) ∩ posi(ℳ ⪰ ∪ {− f }), of which the second factor is equal to ℳ ⪰ ∪ −f ∪ (ℳ ⪰ −f ), so by distributivity, we must check that six intersections are empty: ◻ Section 5.1 (Linear Previsions) PROOF (PROPOSITION 37). We already know that ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ ⊆ ∶= ⋂ P∈ P . Assume, ex absurdo, that equality does not hold. Then there is some f in ⪰ ∖ ℒ ⋗ or ≺ ∖ ℒ ⋖ , but by construction there is then also a P in such that f ∈ ℒ = P , whereby ∐︀{ f };{ f }̃︀ ∩ P = ∅, a contradiction. ◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 38). We need to prove that M P ∩ M Q = ∅ if P ≠ Q, or equivalently, if ℒ = P ≠ ℒ = Q . Assume, ex absurdo, that there is some model ℳ in the intersection, which means that P ∪ Q ⊆ ℳ. Lemma 60 tells us we can choose some f in ℒ = P ∩ ℒ < Q and g in ℒ > P ∩ ℒ = Q . Then f + g ∈ ℒ > P ∩ ℒ < Q , which means that there is confusion in ℳ, a contradiction. ◻ LEMMA 60. Given P and Q in , then ℒ = P ∩ ℒ < Q = −(ℒ = P ∩ ℒ > Q ) ≠ ∅ if P ≠ Q.
PROOF (LEMMA 60). The equality follows by linearity of P and Q. For the inequality, take some f in ℒ such that P f ≠ Q f . Then Q( f − P f ) ≠ P( f − P f ) = 0 = P(P f − f ) ≠ Q(P f − f ) again by linearity of P and Q. ◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 39). There are two models in M ∐︀ℒ ⋗ ;ℒ ⋖̃︀ beneath ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ that are maximal: ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ and ∐︀ℒ > ;ℒ ≤̃︀ . So then Lemma 61 tells us the 'if'-direction is true. Lemma 62 tells us that the 'only if'-direction is true: any model that is not less committal than ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ ≤̃︀ is incompatible with some prevision (either the P or the Q of the lemma). ◻ LEMMA 61. Given P in , then P ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ , P ∐︀ℒ > ;ℒ ≤̃︀ ⊆ M.
PROOF (LEMMA 61). Because of the symmetries involved, we only need to consider one of the two cases; we take the first. By definition P ∐︀ℒ ≥ ;ℒ <̃︀ = cl M ∐︀ℒ > P ∪ℒ ≥ ;ℒ < P ∪ℒ <̃︀ . By Proposition 14 we must verify that the argument's deductive closure avoids confusion: posi(ℒ > P ∪ ℒ ≥ ) = ℒ > P ∪ ℒ ≥ ∪ (ℒ > P + ℒ ≥ ) = ℒ > P ∪ ℒ ≥ because ℒ > P + ℒ ≥ ⊆ ℒ > P , given that coherent previsions are increasing. So ∐︀ℒ > P ∪ ℒ ≥ ;ℒ < P ∪ ℒ <̃︀ is already deductively closed and avoids confusion as inf f ≥ 0 for f in ℒ ≥ and supg ≤ 0 for g in ℒ < . ◻ LEMMA 62. Given f in ℒ such that f ∉ ℒ ≥ ∪ ℒ ≤ , then there are P and Q in such that f ∈ ℒ > P ∩ ℒ < Q .
PROOF (LEMMA 62). The assumption implies inf f < 0 < sup f . Choose for P a prevision such that P f = sup f and for Q one such that Q f = inf f . ◻ Section 5.2 (Lower Previsions) PROOF (PROPOSITION 40). ℳ P avoids confusion if ∶= ext D ( P ∪ ) does. So first, we must look at ⪰ = posi ( P + R > ) ∪ ⪰ = posi( P + R > ) ∪ ⪰ ∪ posi( P + R > ) + ⪰ = ⪰ ∪ (ℒ ⋗ + posi P ), where the second equality follows from ⪰ ∈ C and for the third moreover ⪰ ∪ {0} + R > = ℒ ⋗ was used. Then avoids confusion if = ⪰ ∪ (ℒ ⋗ + posi P ) ∩ ≺ = ∅, so if posi P ∩ ℒ ⋖ = ∅ by taking into account ⪰ ∩ ≺ = ∅, Lemma 48, and ≺ − ℒ ⋗ = ℒ ⋖ . This is equivalent to the condition of the proposition. Now, when = ∅, ℳ P ∶= ext M , so we have to calculate ≺ − ⪰ = ( ≺ − ⪰ ) ∪ ( ≺ − ℒ ⋗ − posi P ) = ≺ ∪ (ℒ ⋖ − posi P ), which proves the expression given. ◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 41). For any f in ℒ, we have that
where the second equality follows from the fact that sup makes the distinction between ≥ and ⋗ moot. ◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 42). First we prove that (ℳ P ℳ ) ⪰ ⊆ ℳ ⪰ . The expression found for ℳ P in Proposition 40 and the convexity of ℳ ⪰ tells us it is sufficient to prove that P ℳ +ℒ ⋗ ⊆ ℳ ⪰ . Any left-hand side element can be written as f − sup{α ∈ R ∶ f − α ∈ ℳ ⪰ } + h, with f ∈ ℒ and h ∈ ℒ ⋗ . Furthermore, we can always write h = ε + h ′ , with ε ∈ R > and h ′ ∈ ℒ ⋗ . Then the proof is complete by realizing that ℒ ⋗ ⊆ ⪰ ⊆ ℳ ⪰ .
Second comes the rejection inequality: (ℳ P ℳ ) ≺ = ≺ ∪ ≺ − (ℳ P ℳ ) ⪰ ⊆ ≺ ∪ ( ≺ − ℳ ⪰ ) ⊆ ℳ ≺ , where the equality follows from the expression found for ℳ P in Proposition 40, the first inclusion from the first part of this proof and the last inclusion from No Limbo (5). ◻ PROOF (PROPOSITION 43). The following derivation proves Claim (i):
= max sup{α ∈ R ∶ f − α ⋗ g ∧ g ∈ posi P },P f (def. sup, Equation (20)) = max{sup g∈posi P inf( f − g),inf f } (def. sup, Proposition 41) = sup g∈posi P inf( f − g), ( P ≠ ∅, so 0 ∈ cl(posi P ), def. sup)
where 'cl' denotes closure in the supremum-norm topology. Claim (ii) follows from (i) because g ∶= f −P f ∈ P ⊆ posi P for f in . Because of (ii), the left-hand side of Claim (iii) is equivalent to ∀ f ∈ ∶ P ℳ P f ≤ P f , or, by (i), to inf f ∈ inf g∈posi P inf g−( f −P f ) , which is equivalent to the coherence condition by definition of P . ◻ Section 6 (An Application: Dealing with Symmetry) PROOF (PROPOSITION 44). We first need to realise that ∐︀ℒ ;∅̃︀∪∐︀ℒ > ;ℒ <̃︀ ∈ Ã, ℒ > ∈ C, and ∅ ≠ ℒ ∈ L. Then Proposition 30 tells us its reckoning extension has No Confusion if and only if 0 ∉ ℒ > + ℒ , which is equivalent to the given condition. The expression of this extension then follows from Proposition 31. ◻
